In this paper, we present new results on the fair and e cient allocation of indivisible goods to agents that have monotone, submodular, non-additive valuation functions over bundles. Despite their simple structure, these agent valuations are a natural model for several real-world domains. We show that, if such a valuation function has binary marginal gains, a socially optimal (i.e. utilitarian social welfare-maximizing) allocation that achieves envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) exists and is computationally tractable. We also prove that the Nash welfare-maximizing and the leximin allocations both exhibit this fairness-e ciency combination, by showing that they can be achieved by minimizing any symmetric strictly convex function over utilitarian optimal outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst valuation function class not subsumed by additive valuations for which it has been established that an allocation maximizing Nash welfare is EF1. Moreover, for a subclass of these valuation functions based on maximum (unweighted) bipartite matching, we show that a leximin allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
How should a collection of goods be divided amongst a population of agents with subjective valuations? Are there computationally e cient methods for nding good allocations? ese questions have been the focus of intense study in the CS/Econ community in recent years. Several criteria of justice have been proposed in the literature. Some criteria focus on agent welfare: for example, Pareto optimality, a popular criterion of allocative e ciency, stipulates that there is no other allocation that improves one agent's valuation without hurting another. Other criteria consider how agents perceive their bundles as compared to others' allocation; a key concept here is one of envy: an agent envies another if she believes that her bundle is worth less than that of another's [Foley, 1967] . Envy-free (EF) allocations that are also Pareto optimal or even complete (i.e. each item is allocated to at least one agent) are not guaranteed to exist when the items under consideration are indivisible: consider the case of two agents and one valuable item -assigning the item to any one of them results in envy by the other. is naturally leads to the notion of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) [Budish, 2011] : for every pair of agents i and j, j's bundle contains some item whose removal results in i not envying j; Lipton et al. [2004] provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a complete EF1 allocation.
Of particular interest are methods that simultaneously achieve several desiderata. When agent valuations are additive, i.e. the value for a bundle is the sum of the values for its individual items, Caragiannis et al. [2016] show that allocations that satisfy both envy-freeness up to one item and Pareto optimality (PO) exist, speci cally the ones that maximize the product of agents' utilities -also known as max Nash welfare (MNW). Barman et al. [2018a,b] show that an allocation with these properties can be computed in (pseudo-)polynomial time. Indeed, most work on the fair and e cient allocation of indivisible goods has focused on the additive se ing; at present, li le is known in this respect about other classes of valuation functions. is is where our work comes in.
Our contributions
We focus on monotone submodular valuations with binary marginal gains that we refer to as (0, 1)-SUB valuations. is class of valuations naturally arises in many practical applications.
For example, suppose that a government body wishes to fairly allocate public goods to individuals of di erent minority groups (say, in accordance with a diversity promoting policy). is could apply to the assignment of kindergarten slots to children from di erent neighborhoods/socioeconomic classes [U.S. Department of Education, O ce of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2017], or of ats in public housing estates to applicants of di erent ethnicities [Deng et al., 2013] . A possible way of achieving group fairness in this se ing is to model each minority group as an agent (i.e. an agent consists of many individuals) such that each agent's valuation function is based on optimally matching items to its constituents -then, envy naturally captures the notion that no group should believe that other groups were o ered be er bundles (this is the fairness notion studied in [Benabbou et al., 2019] ). Assignment-based valuations naturally arise in other domains: consider an allocation mechanism assigning students to courses; each student has a set of courses she would like to take, which t into her schedule in a certain manner. us, a student's valuation function is induced by a maximal matching of courses to her schedule (as opposed to the additive course allocation model more commonly used, e.g. by Budish [2011] ). Matching-based valuations are non-additive in general and, in fact, constitute a signi cant subclass of submodular valuations called OXS valuations [Leme, 2017] . e binary marginal gains assumption is best understood in context of matching-based valuations -in this scenario, it simply means that individuals either approve or disapprove items, and do not distinguish among items they approve (we call OXS functions with binary individual preferences (0, 1)-OXS valuations).
is is a reasonable assumption in kindergarten slot allocation (all approved/available slots are identical), and is implicitly made in some public housing mechanisms (e.g. when selecting ats in the Singapore public housing system, individuals need to e ectively approve a set of ats by selecting a block, and are precluded from expressing a more re ned preference model).
In addition, imposing certain constraints on the underlying matching problem retains the submodularity of the agents' induced valuation functions: if there is a hard limit (due to a budget or an exogenous quota) on the number of items each group is allowed (or able) to receive -such quotas exist in both the Singapore public housing system (ethnicity-based), and in allocating kindergarten slots in many U.S. cities (socioeconomic status-based) -then agents' valuations are truncated matching-based valuations. Such valuation functions are not OXS, but still submodular. Our results apply to this broader class, as agents still have binary/dichotomous preferences over items. e following are our main existential and computational results on the compatibility of (approximate) envy-freeness with welfare-based allocation concepts (see also Figure 1 and Table 1 ).
(a) For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, we show that an EF1 allocation that also maximizes the utilitarian social welfare or USW (hence is Pareto optimal) always exists and can be computed in polynomial time. (b) For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, we show that leximin 1 and MNW allocations both possess the EF1 property. (c) For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, we provide a characterization of the leximin allocations; we show that they are identical to the minimizers of any symmetric strictly convex function over utilitarian optimal allocations. We obtain the same characterization for MNW allocations.
1 Roughly speaking, a leximin allocation is one that maximizes the realized valuation of the worst-o agent and, subject to that, maximizes that of the second worst-o agent, and so on.
MNW
Leximin max-USW+EF1 (0, 1)-OXS poly-time ( eorem 3.1) poly-time ( eorem 3.1) poly-time ( eorem 2.4) (0, 1)-SUB ? ? poly-time ( eorem 2.4) Table 1 . Summary of our computational complexity results. (d) For (0, 1)-OXS valuations, we show that both leximin and MNW allocations can be computed e ciently. Result (a) is remarkably positive: the EF1 and utilitarian welfare objectives are incompatible in general, even for additive valuations, as shown by Example A.1 in the appendix. In fact, maximizing the utilitarian social welfare among all EF1 allocations is NP-hard for general valuations [Barman et al., 2019] . Such strong welfare/fairness guarantees are not known even for simple classes such as binary additive valuations (i.e. the value of a subset of items is the sum of the values of individual items which are, in turn, valued at either 0 or 1 each), which are subsumed by the (0, 1)-SUB class.
Result (b) is reminiscent of the main theorem in Caragiannis et al. [2016] , showing that any MNW allocation is PO and EF1 under additive valuations; they also showed that a PO and EF1 allocation may not exist under subadditive/supermodular valuations ( eorem 3.3) and MNW does not imply EF1 for arbitrary, real-valued submodular functions but le the PO+EF1 existence question open for the submodular class. e open questions in this paper have received substantial a ention in recent literature (for instance, progress has been made on EFX or envy-freeness up to the least valued item, see e.g. [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018] ) but the PO+EF1 existence issue beyond additive valuations is yet to be se led. To our knowledge, (0, 1)-SUB is the rst valuation class not subsumed by additive valuations for which the EF1 property of the MNW allocation and multiple alternative ways of achieving the PO+EF1 combination have been established. e other properties of the MNW principle that we have uncovered for this valuation class (results (b) and (c)) may be of independent interest (see the discussion in Section 4).
Our computational tractability results (d) are signi cant since we know that for arbitrary real valuations, it is NP-hard to compute the following types of allocations: PO+EF even for the seemingly simple class of binary additive valuations which is subsumed by our (0, 1)-SUB class (Bouveret and Lang [2008] Proposition 21); leximin [Bezáková and Dani, 2005] ; and MNW [Nguyen et al., 2014] . Moreover, although previous work on binary additive valuations established the polynomial time-solvability of MNW (and thus nding a PO and EF1 allocation) via a clever algorithm based on a subtle running time analysis [Barman et al., 2018b] , we extend this result to the strictly larger (0, 1)-OXS class by uncovering deeper connections to the rich literature on combinatorial optimization.
From a technical perspective, our work makes extensive use of tools and concepts from matroid theory. For instance, most of our results are based on an observation that the set of clean bundles (i.e. bundles containing no item with zero marginal value for the agent under consideration) forms the set of independent sets of a matroid for every agent. While some papers have explored the application of matroid theory to the fair division problem [Biswas and Barman, 2018, Gourvès and Monnot, 2017] , we believe that ours is the rst to demonstrate its strong connection with fairness and e ciency guarantees. We defer omi ed proofs and examples to the appendix for ease of exposition.
Related work
Our paper is related to the active area of research on the fair allocation of indivisible goods. Budish [2011] was the rst to formalize the notion of EF1; but, it implicitly appeared in Lipton et al. [2004] , who designed a polynomial time algorithm that returns an EF1 allocation for arbitrary monotone valuations (called the envy graph algorithm). Caragiannis et al. [2016] prove that EF1 and Pareto optimal allocations exist for non-negative additive valuations; Barman et al. [2018a] subsequently provide a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for computing such allocations. Closely related to ours is the work of Barman et al. [2018b] , who developed an e cient greedy algorithm to nd an MNW allocation when the valuation of each agent is a concave function that depends on the number of items approved by her. We note that this class of valuations does not subsume the class of (0, 1)-OXS valuations since bundles of the same number of approved items may have di erent values under the la er class; 2 hence the polynomial-time complexity result of Barman et al. [2018a] does not imply eorem 3.1.
In this paper, we admit allocations that may be incomplete (i.e. not all items are allocated to the agents under consideration) but satisfy strong fairness and e ciency guarantees. One motivation for our paper is recent work by Benabbou et al. [2019] on promoting diversity in assignment problems through e cient, EF1 allocations of bundles to a ribute-based groups in the population. Other work in this vein includes fairness/diversity through quotas [Aziz et al., 2019 , Benabbou et al., 2018 , Suzuki et al., 2018 , or by the optimization of carefully constructed functions [Ahmed et al., 2017 , Dickerson et al., 2019 , Lang and Skowron, 2016 in allocation/subset selection.
We note that Lipton et al. [2004] 's classic envy graph algorithm does not guarantee Pareto optimality (although the output allocation satis es completeness). A summary of this algorithm follows: in each iteration, a new item is allocated to an arbitrary agent not currently envied by any other agent; the envy graph is constructed by drawing a directed edge from an agent to every agent it envies; if a cycle forms in the graph, it is eliminated by transferring bundles from envied to envious agent on the (reverse) cycle, starting with the smallest cycle in case of overlapping cycles. We can augment the rst step of the above algorithm with a natural heuristic: allocate the item under consideration to an agent that has the maximum marginal gain from it, breaking ties arbitrarily -for valuations with binary marginal gains, this is equivalent to giving the item to an agent whose marginal gain for it (given its current bundle) is 1, and to an arbitrary agent if none has non-zero marginal gain for it. Here is a simple example with (0, 1)-SUB valuations where the output of this approach may not be Pareto optimal: consider 2 agents and 2 items such Lipton et al. [2004] 's algorithm may assign o 1 to agent 1; then o 2 will be arbitrarily allocated, resulting in an allocation A with 1 (A 1 ) = 1 and 1 (A 2 ) = 0. is is Pareto dominated by A 1 = {o 2 }, A 2 = {o 1 } where each 2 Consider 3 items, o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , and a group of members S = {1, 2, 3} with member 1 assigning weight 1 to items o 1 and o 3 , and members 2 and 3 assigning weight 1 to item o 2 only. e value of a maximum matching between {o 1 , o 2 } and S is 2 while the value of a maximum matching between {o 1 , o 3 } and S is 1. agent realizes a valuation of 1. e myopic 3 , sequential nature of the algorithm results in this undesirable outcome.
MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
roughout the paper, given a positive integer r , let [r ] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , r }. We are given a set N = [n] of agents, and a set O = {o 1 , . . . , o m } of items or goods. Subsets of O are referred to as bundles, and each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function i : 2 O → R + over bundles where i (∅) = 0. 4 We further assume polynomial-time oracle access to the valuation i of all agents. Given a valuation function i :
An allocation A of items to agents is a collection of n disjoint bundles A 1 , . . . , A n , such that i ∈N A i ⊆ O; the bundle A i is allocated to agent i. Given an allocation A, we denote by A 0 the set of unallocated items, also referred to as withheld items. We may refer to agent i's valuation of its bundle i (A i ) under the allocation A as its realized valuation under A. An allocation is complete if every item is allocated to some agent, i.e. A 0 = ∅. We admit incomplete, but clean allocations: a bundle S ⊆ O is clean for i ∈ N if it contains no item o ∈ S for which agent i has zero marginal gain (i.e., ∆ i (S \ {o}; o) = 0); allocation A is clean if each allocated bundle A i is clean for the agent i that receives it. It is easy to 'clean' any allocation without changing any realized valuation by iteratively revoking items of zero marginal gain from respective agents and placing them in A 0 . For example, if for agent i, i ({1}) = i ({2}) = i ({1, 2}) = 1, then the bundle A i = {1, 2} is not clean for agent i (and neither is any allocation where i receives items 1 and 2) but it can be cleaned by moving item 1 (or item 2 but not both) to A 0 .
Fairness and e iciency criteria
Our fairness criteria are based on the concept of envy. Agent i envies agent j under an allocation A if i (A i ) < i (A j ). An allocation A is envy-free (EF) if no agent envies another. We will use the following relaxation of the EF property due to Budish [2011] : we say that A is envy-free up to one good (EF1) if, for every i, j ∈ N , i does not envy j or there exists o in A j such that i (A i ) ≥ i (A j \ {o}).
e e ciency concept that we are primarily interested in is Pareto optimality. An allocation A is said to Pareto dominate the allocation A if i (A i ) ≥ i (A i ) for all agents i ∈ N and j (A j ) > j (A j ) for some agent j ∈ N . An allocation is Pareto optimal (or PO for short) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
ere are several ways of measuring the welfare of an allocation [Sen, 1970] . Speci cally, given an allocation A,
• its utilitarian social welfare is USW(A)
). An allocation A is said to be utilitarian optimal (respectively, egalitarian optimal) if it maximizes USW(A) (respectively, ESW(A)) among all allocations. Since it is possible that the maximum a ainable Nash welfare is 0, we de ne the maximum Nash social welfare (MNW) allocation as follows: given a problem instance, we nd a largest subset of agents, say N max ⊆ N , to which we can allocate bundles of positive values, and compute an allocation to agents in N max that maximizes the product 3 e algorithm is myopic in the sense that the allocation of a new item in each iteration does not take into account its downstream impact on e ciency and is only geared towards maintaining the EF1 invariant. 4 e property i (∅) = 0 is called normalization in the literature. of their realized valuations. If N max is not unique, we choose the one that results in the highest product of realized valuations. e leximin welfare is a lexicographic re nement of the maximin welfare concept. Formally, for real n-dimensional vectors x and , x is lexicographically greater than or equal to (denoted by x ≥ L ) if and only if x = , or x and for the minimum index j such that x j j we have x j > j . For each allocation A, we denote by θ (A) the vector of the components i (A i ) (i ∈ N ) arranged in non-decreasing order. A leximin allocation A is an allocation that maximizes the egalitarian welfare in a lexicographic sense, i.e., θ (A) ≥ L θ (A ) for any other allocation A .
Submodular valuations
e main theme of all results in this section is that, when all agents have (0, 1)-SUB valuations, fairness and e ciency properties are compatible with each other and also with the optimal values of all three welfare functions we consider. Lemma 2.1 below shows that Pareto optimality of optimal welfare is unsurprising; but, it is non-trivial to prove the EF1 property in each case. L 2.1. For monotone valuations, every utilitarian optimal, MNW, and leximin allocation is Pareto optimal.
Before proceeding further, we state some useful properties of the (0, 1)-SUB valuation class. is property leads us to the following equivalence between the size and realized valuation of every clean, allocated bundle for the valuation subclass under consideration -a crucial component in all our proofs. Note that cleaning any optimal-welfare allocation leaves the welfare unaltered and ensures that each resulting withheld item is of zero marginal gain to each agent; hence it preserves the PO condition. 
A simple example of one good and two agents shows that an envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation may not exist even under (0, 1)-SUB valuations.
is justi es our quest for EF1 and Pareto-optimal allocations.
Utilitarian optimal and EF1 allocation
For non-negative additive valuations, Caragiannis et al. [2016] prove that every MNW allocation is Pareto optimal and EF1. However, the existence question of an allocation satisfying the PO and EF1 properties remains open for submodular valuations. We show that the existence of a PO+EF1 allocation [Caragiannis et al., 2016] extends to the class of submodular valuations with binary marginal gains. In fact, we provide a surprisingly strong relation between e ciency and fairness: both utilitarian optimality (stronger than Pareto optimality) and EF1 turn out to be compatible under (0, 1)-SUB valuations! T 2.4. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, a utilitarian optimal allocation that is also EF1 exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Our result is constructive: we provide a way of computing the above allocation in Algorithm 1. e proof of eorem 2.4 and those of the la er theorems utilize Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 which shed light on the interesting interaction between envy and (0, 1)-SUB valuations. 6 L 2.5 (T ). For monotone submodular valuation functions, if agent i envies agent j under an allocation A, then there is an item o ∈ A j for which i has a positive marginal gain.
P
. Assume that agent i envies agent j under an allocation
As in the proof of Proposition 2.2, if we de ne S 0 = ∅ and S t = {o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o t } for each t ∈ [r ], we can write the following telescoping series:
However, submodularity implies that
Together with monotonicity, this yields
Note that Lemma 2.5 holds for submodular functions with arbitrary real-valued marginal gains, and is trivially true for (non-negative) additive valuations. However, there exist non-submodular valuation functions that violate the transferability property, even when they have binary marginal gains (see Example A.2 in the appendix).
Below, we show that if i's envy towards j cannot be eliminated by removing one item, then the sizes of their clean bundles di er by at least two. Formally, we say that agent i envies j up to more
2.6. For submodular functions with binary marginal gains, if agent i envies agent j up to more than 1 item under an allocation A and j's bundle A j is clean, then j (A j ) ≥ i (A i ) + 2.
P
. From the de nition:
which proves the theorem statement since all valuations are integers.
We are now ready to show that under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, utilitarian social welfare maximization is polynomial-time solvable (2.7). To this end, we will exploit the fact that the set of clean bundles forms the set of independent sets of a matroid. We start by introducing some notions from matroid theory. Formally, a matroid is an ordered pair (E, I), where E is some nite set and I is a family of its subsets (referred to as the independent sets of the matroid), which satis es the following three axioms:
e rank function r : 2 E → Z of a matroid returns the rank of each set X , i.e. the maximum size of an independent subset of X . Another equivalent way to de ne a matroid is to use the axiom systems for a rank function. We require that (R1) r (X ) ≤ |X |, (R2) r is monotone, and (R3) r is submodular. en, the pair (E, I) where I = { X ⊆ E | r (X ) = |X | } is a matroid. T 2.7. For submodular functions with binary marginal gains, one can compute a clean utilitarian optimal allocation in polynomial time.
. We prove the claim by a reduction to the matroid intersection problem. Let E be the set of pairs of items and agents, i.e.,
Clearly, r i is also a submodular function with binary marginal gains; combining this with Proposition 2.2 and the fact that r i (∅) = 0, it is easy to see that each r i is a rank function of a matroid. us, the set of clean bundles for i, i.e I i = { X ⊆ E | r i (X ) = |X | }, is the set of independent sets of a matroid. Taking the union I = I 1 ∪ · · · ∪ I n , the pair (E, I) is known to form a matroid [Korte and Vygen, 2006] , o en referred to as a union matroid. By de nition,
so any independent set in I corresponds to a union of clean bundles for each i ∈ N and vice versa. To ensure that each item is assigned at most once (i.e. bundles are disjoint), we will de ne another matroid (E, O) where the set of independent sets is given by
Here
is known as a partition matroid [Korte and Vygen, 2006 ]. Now, observe that a common independent set of the two matroids X ∈ O ∩ I corresponds to a clean allocation A of our original instance where each agent i receives the items o with {o, i} ∈ X ; indeed, each item o is allocated at most once because |E o ∩ X | ≤ 1, and each A i is clean because the realized valuation of agent i under A is exactly the size of the allocated bundle. Conversely, any clean allocation A of our instance corresponds to an independent set X
by Proposition 2.3, and hence X i ∈ I i , which implies that X ∈ I; also, |X ∩ E o | ≤ 1 as A is an allocation, and hence X ∈ O.
us, the maximum utilitarian social welfare is the same as the size of a maximum common independent set in I ∩ O. It is well known that one can nd a largest common independent set in two matroids in time O(|E| 3 θ ) where θ is the maximum complexity of the two independence oracles [Edmonds, 1979] . Since the maximum complexity of checking independence in two matroids (E, O) and (E, I) is bounded by O(mnF ) where F is the maximum complexity of the value query oracle, we can nd a set X ∈ I ∩ O with maximum |X | in time O(|E| 3 mnF ).
We are now ready to prove eorem 2.4. P T 2.4. Algorithm 1 maintains optimal USW as an invariant and terminates on an EF1 allocation. Speci cally, we rst compute a clean allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare. e EIT subroutine in the algorithm iteratively diminshes envy by transferring an item from the envied bundle to the envious agent; Lemma 2.5 ensures that there is always an item in the envied bundle for which the envious agent has a positive marginal gain.
Correctness: Each EIT step maintains the optimal utilitarian social welfare as well as cleanness: an envied agent's valuation diminishes exactly by 1 while that of the envious agent increases by exactly 1. us, if it terminates, the EIT subroutine retains the initial (optimal) USW and, by the stopping criterion, induces the EF1 property. To show that the algorithm terminates in polynomial time, we de ne the potential function Φ(A)
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for nding utilitarian optimal EF1 allocation 1 Compute a clean, utilitarian optimal allocation A. 2 /*Envy-Induced Transfers (EIT)*/ 3 while there are two agents i, j such that i envies j more than 1 item. do
At each step of the algorithm, Φ(A) strictly decreases by 2 or a larger integer. To see this, let A denote the resulting allocation a er reallocation of item o from agent j to i. Since A is clean,
Complexity: It remains to analyze the running time of the algorithm. By eorem 2.7, computing a clean utilitarian optimal allocation can be done in polynomial time. e value of the non-negative potential function has a polynomial upper bound:
us, Algorithm 1 terminates in polynomial time.
An interesting implication of the above analysis is that a utilitarian optimal allocation that minimizes i ∈N i (A i ) 2 is always EF1. C 2.8. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any clean, utilitarian optimal allocation A that minimizes Φ(A) i ∈N i (A i ) 2 among all utilitarian optimal allocations is EF1.
R 1 (C ). In the proof of eorem 2.4, we used the sum of squared valuations as the potential function to prove termination in polynomial time mainly for ease of exposition. However, any symmetric, strictly convex, 5 polynomial function of the realized valuations strictly decreases with each EIT step and, as such, it would be su cient to use any such function as our potential function; moreover, Corollary 2.8 holds for any such function Φ(·) as well -we elaborate on this theme in Section 2.4. Despite its simplicity, Algorithm 1 signi cantly generalizes that of Benabbou et al. [2019] 's eorem 4 (which ensures the existence of a non-wasteful EF1 allocation for (0, 1)-OXS valuations) to (0, 1)-SUB valuations. We note, however, that the resulting allocation may be neither MNW nor leximin even when agents have (0, 1)-OXS valuations: Example 2.9 below illustrates this and also shows that the converse of Corollary 2.8 does not hold.
Example 2.9. e instance we use is Example 1 in Benabbou et al. [2019] . ere are two groups (i.e. agents with (0, 1)-OXS valuations) and six items o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 4 , o 5 , o 6 . e rst group N 1 (identical to agent 1) contains four members a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 and the second group N 2 (identical to agent 2) contains four members b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 ; each individual has utility (weight) 1 for an item o if and only if she is adjacent to o in the adjoining graph:
e valuation function of each group for any bundle X is de ned as the value (equivalently, the size) of a maximum-size matching of X to the group's members. e algorithm may initially compute a utilitarian optimal allocation A that assigns items o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 5 to the group N 1 (with these items assigned to a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 respectively), and the remaining items to group N 2 (with o 4 , o 6 assigned to b 2 , b 4 respectively). en, 1 (A 1 ) = 4 > 2 = 1 (A 2 ) and 2 (A 2 ) = 2 = 2 (A 1 ), hence the allocation A is EF1 -in fact, envy-free! So, the EIT subroutine will not be invoked and the output of Algorithm 1 will be A. However, the (unique) leximin and MNW allocation assigns items o 1 , o 2 , o 3 to the rst group, and the remaining items to the second group -this is also the (unique) utilitarian optimal allocation with the minimum sum of squares of the agents' valuations. R 2 (EFX ). It is worthwhile at this point to comment on the implications of our results for a stronger version of the EF1 property that has received considerable a ention in recent literature: envy-freeness up to any item, o en called the EFX condition. ere are two de nitions in the literature:
(1) Caragiannis et al. [2016] who introduced this concept (for additive valuations) called it envy-freeness up to the least (positively) valued good; we can naturally extend their de nition to general valuations as follows: an allocation A is EFX if, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that i envies j,
We will call this property EFX + for clarity. (2) Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] de ned an allocation A to be EFX if, for every pair of agents
-this stronger de nition favors allocations where more agents are envy-free of others since
whenever o is of zero marginal value to agent i with respect to the bundle A j : the authors show that under this de nition, no EFX allocation can be Pareto optimal even for two agents with additive valuations or general but identical valuations. 6 Caragiannis et al. [2019] and Chaudhury et al. [2019] use this de nition as well. Following Kyropoulou et al. [2019] , who studied both the (above) weaker and (this) stronger variants of approximate envy-freeness under a di erent valuation model, we call this stronger property EFX 0 . For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, all items with non-zero marginal values for an agent are also valued identically at 1, hence EF1 trivially implies EFX + ; eorem 2.4 and Corollary 2.8 further guarantee the existence of an EFX + and PO allocation for any instance under this valuation class. However, we demonstrate with Example A.3 with (0, 1)-OXS valuations in the appendix that even an EF1 and utilitarian optimal (hence PO) allocation may not satisfy the EFX 0 condition.
MNW and Leximin allocation
We saw in Section 2.3 that under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, a simple iterative procedure allows us to reach an EF1 allocation while preserving utilitarian optimality. However, as we previously noted, such allocations are not necessarily leximin or MNW. In this subsection, we characterize the set of leximin and MNW allocations under (0, 1)-SUB valuations. We start by showing that Pareto optimal allocations coincide with utilitarian optimal allocations when agents have (0, 1)-SUB valuations. Intuitively, if an allocation is not utilitarian optimal, one can always nd an 'augmenting' path that makes at least one agent happier but no other agent worse o .
In the subsequent proof, we will use the following notions and results from matroid theory: Given a matroid (E, I), the sets in 2 E \ I are called dependent, and a minimal dependent set of a matroid is called a circuit. e following is a crucial property of circuits. Given a matroid (E, I), we denote by C(I, X , ) the unique circuit contained in X ∪ { } for any X ∈ I and ∈ E \ X such that X ∪ { } I.
T 2.11. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any Pareto optimal allocation is utilitarian optimal.
P
. De ne E, X i , E i , I i for i ∈ N , I, and O as in the proof of eorem 2.7. We rst observe that for each X ∈ I and each ∈ E \ X , if X ∪ { } I, then there is agent i ∈ N whose corresponding items in X i together with is not clean, i.e., X i ∪ { } I i , which by Lemma 2.10 implies that the circuit C(I, X , ) is contained in E i , i.e., C(I, X , ) = C(I i , X , ).
(2.1)
Now to prove the claim, let A be a Pareto optimal allocation. Without loss of generality, we assume that A is clean. en, as we have seen before, A corresponds to a common independent set X * in I ∩ O given by
Suppose towards a contradiction that A does not maximize the utilitarian social welfare. is means that X * is not a largest common independent set of I and O. It is known that given two matroids and their common independent set, if it is not a maximum-size common independent set, then there is an 'augmenting' path [Edmonds, 1979] .
To formally de ne an augmenting path, we de ne an auxiliary graph G X * = (E, B (1) X * ∪ B (2) X * ) where the set of arcs is given by
Since X * is not a maximum common independent set of O and I, the set X * admits an augmenting path, which is an alternating path P = ( 0 , x 1 , 1 , . . . , x s , s ) in G X * with 0 , 1 , . . . , s X * and x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s ∈ X * , where X * can be augmented by one element along the path, i.e., X = (X * \ {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s }) ∪ { 0 , 1 , . . . , s } ∈ I ∩ O. Now let's write the pairs of agents and items that correspond to t and x t as follows:
Since each x t (t ∈ [s]) belongs to the unique circuit C(I, X * , t −1 ), which is contained in the set of edges incident to i( t −1 ) by the observation made in (2.1), we have i(
is means that along the augmenting path P, each agent i(x t ) receives a new item o( t −1 ) and discards the old item o(x t ).
Now consider the reallocation corresponding to X where agent i(x t ) receives a new item o( t −1 ) but loses the item o(x t ) for each t = 1, 2, . . . , s, and agent i( s ) receives the item o( s ). Such a reallocation increases the valuation of agent i( s ) by 1, while it does not decrease the valuations of all the intermediate agents, i(x 1 ), i(x 2 ), . . . , i(x s ), as well as the other agents whose agents do not appear on P. We thus conclude that A is Pareto dominated by the new allocation, a contradiction. eorem 2.11 above, along with Lemma 2.1, implies that both leximin and MNW allocations are utilitarian optimal. Next, we show that for the class of (0, 1)-SUB valuations, leximin and MNW allocations are identical to each other; further, they can be characterized as the minimizers of any symmetric strictly convex function among all utilitarian optimal allocations.
A
and is strictly convex if for any x, ∈ Z n with x and λ ∈ (0, 1) where λx
Examples of symmetric, strictly convex functions are the following:
We start by showing that given a non-leximin socially optimal allocation A, there exists an adjacent socially optimal allocation A which is the result of transferring one item from a 'happy' agent j to a less 'happy' agent i. e underlying submodularity guarantees the existence of such allocation. We denote by χ i the n-dimensional incidence vector where the j-th component of χ i is 1 if j = i, and it is 0 otherwise. L 2.12. Suppose that agents have (0,1)−SUB valuations. Let A be a utilitarian optimal allocation. If A is not a leximin allocation, then there is another utilitarian optimal allocation A such that
P . Let A be an arbitrary utilitarian optimal allocation which is not leximin, and let A * be a leximin allocation. Recall that A * is utilitarian optimal by eorem 2.11. Without loss of generality, we assume that both A and A * are clean allocations. Now take a clean allocation A that minimizes the symmetric di erence i ∈N |A i A * i | over all clean allocation with θ (A ) = θ (A). Assume also w.l.o.g. that 1 (A 1 ) ≤ 2 (A 2 ) ≤ · · · ≤ n (A n ). We let j 1 (A * j 1 ) ≤ j 2 (A * j 2 ) ≤ · · · ≤ j n (A * j n ). Since A * lexicographically dominates A , for the minimum index k with j (A k ) j k (A * j k ),
, the k-th smallest value of realized valuations under A is at least j k (A * j k ), contradicting with (2.2). Take the minimum index i satisfying (2.3). Since both A and A * are clean allocations, we have
, then h-th smallest value of the realized valuations under A would be strictly greater than that under A * , yielding θ (A ) > L θ (A * ), a contradiction. Now, recall that the family of clean bundles I h = { S ⊆ O | h (S) = |S | } for h ∈ N forms a family of independent sets of a matroid. By (I3) of the independent-set matroid axioms and by the inequality (2.4), there exists an item o 1 ∈ A * i \ A i with positive contribution to A i , i.e., i (A i ∪ {o 1 }) = i (A i ) + 1. By utilitarian optimality of A , o 1 is allocated to some agent, i.e., o 1 ∈ A i 1 for some i 1 i. Consider the following three cases:
• Suppose i 1 (A i 1 ) ≥ i (A i ) + 2. en, we obtain a desired allocation by transferring o 1 from i 1 to i. • Suppose i 1 (A i 1 ) = i (A i ) + 1. en by transferring o 1 from i 1 to i, we get another utilitarian optimal allocation with the same vector as θ (A ), which has a smaller symmetric di erence than i ∈N |A i A * i |, a contradiction. • Suppose i 1 (A i 1 ) ≤ i (A i ). We will rst show that i 1 (A i 1 ) ≤ i 1 (A * i 1 ). By (2.5), this clearly holds if i 1 ≤ i. Also, when i 1 > i, this means that i 1 (A i 1 ) = i (A i ); thus i 1 (A i 1 ) ≤ i 1 (A * i 1 ), as otherwise the i-th smallest value of realized valuations under A would be greater than that under A * , contradicting that A * is leximin. Further by the facts that |A i 1 \ {o 1 }| < |A * i 1 | and that both A i 1 \ {o 1 } and A * i 1 are clean (i.e., independent sets of a matroid), there exists an
Again by utilitarian optimality of A , o 2 is allocated to some agent, i.e., o 2 ∈ A i 2 for some i 2 i 1 . Repeating the same argument and le ing i 0 = i, we obtain a sequence of items and agents Figure 2 for an illustration of the sequence. If the same agent appears again, i.e., i h = i h for some h < h ≤ t, then by transferring items along the cycle, we can decrease the symmetric di erence with A * , a contradiction. us, the sequence must terminate when we reach the agent i t with i t (A i t ) ≥ i (A i ) + 2. Exchanging items along the path, we get a desired allocation.
We further observe that such adjacent allocation improves the value of any symmetric strictly convex function. L 2.13. Let Φ : Z n → Z be a symmetric strictly convex function. Let A be a utilitarian optimal allocation. Let A be another utilitarian optimal allocation such that θ
. e proof is similar to that of Proposition 6.1 in Frank and Murota [2019a] , which shows the analogous equivalence over the integral base-polyhedron.
which gives us the following inequality (from the strict convexity of Φ):
Now we are ready to prove the following.
T 2.14. Let Φ : Z n → R be a symmetric strictly convex function; let A be some allocation. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) A is a minimizer of Φ over all the utilitarian optimal allocations; and (2) A is a leximin allocation; and (3) A maximizes Nash welfare.
. To prove 1 ⇔ 2, let A be a leximin allocation, and let A be a minimizer of Φ over all the utilitarian optimal allocations. We will show that θ (A ) is the same as θ (A), which, by the uniqueness of the leximin valuation vector and symmetry of Φ, proves the theorem statement.
Assume towards a contradiction that θ (A) θ (A ). By eorem 2.11, we have USW(A) = USW(A ). By Lemma 2.12, we can obtain another utilitarian optimal allocation A that is a lexicographic improvement of A by decreasing the value of the j-th element of θ (A ) by 1 and increasing the value of the i-th element of θ (A ) by 1, where θ (A ) j ≥ θ (A ) i + 2. Applying Lemma 2.13, we get Φ(θ (A )) > Φ(θ (A )), which gives us the desired contradiction.
To prove 2 ⇔ 3, let A be a leximin allocation, and let A be an MNW allocation. Again, we will show that θ (A ) is the same as θ (A), which by the uniqueness of the leximin valuation vector and symmetry of NW, proves the theorem statement. Let N >0 (A) (respectively, N >0 (A )) be the agent subset to which we allocate bundles of positive values under leximin allocation A (respectively, MNW allocation A ). By de nition, the number n of agents who get positive values under leximin allocation A is the same as that of MNW allocation A . Now we denote byθ (A) (respectively,θ (A )) the vector of the non-zero components i (A i ) (respectively, i (A i )) arranged in non-decreasing order. Assume towards a contradiction thatθ (A) > Lθ (A ). Since A maximizes the product NW(A ) when focusing on N >0 (A ) only, the value i ∈N >0 (A ) log i (A i ) is maximized. However, ϕ(x) = − n i=1 log x i is a symmetric convex function for x ∈ Z n with each x i > 0. us, by a similar argument as before, one can show that ϕ(θ (A )) < ϕ(θ (A)), a contradiction. is completes the proof. e above theorem does not generalize to the non-binary case: Example 2.15 represents an instance where neither leximin nor MNW allocation is utilitarian optimal.
Example 2.15. Consider an instance with assignment valuations given as follows. Suppose there are three groups, each of which contains a single agent, Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively, and three items with weights given in Table 2 . e unique leximin and MNW allocation is the allocation 1 2 3
Alice: 2 1 0 Bob: 2 1 0 Charlie: 0 2.9 0.1 that assigns Alice to the rst item, Bob to the second item, and Charlie to the third item; each agent has positive utility at the allocation and the total utilitarian social welfare is 3.1. However, the utilitarian optimal allocation assigns Alice to nothing, Bob to the rst item, and Charlie to the second item, which yields the total utilitarian social welfare 4.9.
Combining the above characterization with the results of Section 2.3, we get the following fairness-e ciency guarantee for (0, 1)-SUB valuations. C 2.16. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any clean leximin or MNW allocation is EF1.
. Since both leximin and MNW allocations are Pareto-optimal, they maximize the utilitarian social welfare, by eorem 2.11. By eorem 2.14 and the fact that the function Φ(A) i ∈N i (A i ) 2 is a symmetric strictly convex function, any leximin or MNW allocation is a utilitarian optimal allocation that minimizes Φ(A) among all utilitarian optimal allocations; hence, if such an allocation is clean, it must be EF1 by Corollary 2.8.
ASSIGNMENT VALUATIONS WITH BINARY GAINS
We now consider the special but practically important case when valuations come from maximum matchings. For this class of valuations, we show that invoking eorem 2.11, one can nd a leximin or MNW allocation in polynomial time, by a reduction to the network ow problem. We note that the complexity of the problem remains open for general submodular valuations with binary marginal gains. T 3.1. For assignment valuations with binary marginal gains, one can nd a leximin or MNW allocation in polynomial time.
P
. e problem of nding a leximin allocation can be reduced to that of nding an integral balanced ow in a network, which has been recently shown to be polynomial-time solvable [Frank and Murota, 2019b] . Speci cally, for a network D = (V , A) with source s, sink t, and a capacity function c : A → Z, a balanced ow is a maximum integral feasible ow where the out-ow vector from the source s to the adjacent vertices h is lexicographically maximized among all maximum integral feasible ows; that is, the smallest ow-value on the edges (s, h) is as large as possible, the second smallest ow-value on the edges (s, h) is as large as possible, and so on. Frank and Murota [2019b] show that one can nd a balanced ow in strongly polynomial time (see Section 7 in Frank and Murota [2019b] ). Now, given an instance of assignment valuations with binary marginal gains, we build the following instance (V , A) of a network ow problem. Let N h denote the set of members in each group h. We rst create a source s and a sink t. We create a vertex h for each group h, a vertex i for each member i of some group, and a vertex o for each item o. We construct the edges of the network as follows:
• for each group h, create an edge (s, h) with capacity m; and • for each group h and member i in group h, create an edge (h, i) with unit capacity; and • for each member i of some group and item o for which i has positive weight u io (i.e. u io = 1), create an edge (i, o) with unit capacity; and • for each item o, create an edge (o, t) with unit capacity.
See Figure 3 for an illustration of the network. We will show that an integral balanced ow f : A → Z of the constructed network corresponds to a leximin allocation. Consider an allocation A f where each group receives the items o for which some member i of the group has positive ow f (i, o) > 0. It is easy to see that the allocation A f maximizes the utilitarian social welfare since the ow f is a maximum integral feasible ow. us, by eorem 2.11, A f has the same utilitarian social welfare as any leximin allocation. To see balancedness, observe that the amount of ow from the source s to each group h is the valuation of h for bundle A In contrast with assignment valuations with binary marginal gains, we show that the problem of computing a leximin or MNW allocation becomes NP-hard for weighted assignment valuations even when there are only two agents.
T 3.2. For two agents with general assignment valuations, it is NP-hard to compute a leximin or MNW allocation.
. e reduction is similar to the hardness reduction for two agents with identical additive valuations [Nguyen et al., 2013, Ramezani and Endriss, 2010] . We give a Turing reduction from P . Recall that an instance of P is given by a set of positive integers W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m }; it is a 'yes'-instance if and only if it can be partitioned into two subsets S 1 and S 2 of W such that the sum of the numbers in S 1 equals the sum of the numbers in S 2 .
Consider an instance of P W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m }. We create m items 1, 2, . . . , m, two groups 1 and 2, and m individuals for each group where every individual has a weight w j for item j. Observe that fore each group, the value of each bundle X is the sum w j ∈X w j : the number of members in the group exceeds the number of items in X , and thus one can fully assign each item to each member of the group.
Suppose we had an algorithm which nds a leximin allocation. Run the algorithm on the allocation problem constructed above to obtain a leximin allocation A. It can be easily veri ed that the instance of P has a solution if and only if 1 (A 1 ) = 2 (A 2 ). Similarly, suppose we had an algorithm which nds an MNW allocation, and run the algorithm to nd an MNW allocation A . Since the valuations are identical, the utilitarian social welfare of the MNW allocation is the sum w j ∈W w j , which means that the product of the valuations is maximized when both groups have the same realized valuation. us, the instance of P has a solution if and only if 1 (A 1 ) = 2 (A 2 ).
DISCUSSION
We studied allocations of indivisible goods under submodular valuations with binary marginal gains in terms of the interplay among envy, e ciency, and various welfare concepts. We showed that three seemingly disjoint outcomes -minimizers of arbitrary symmetric strictly convex functions among utilitarian optimal allocations, the leximin allocation, and the MNW allocation -coincide in this class of valuations. In particular, eorem 2.14 reduces the problem of nding a leximin/MNW allocation for (0, 1)-SUB valuations to the minimization of the sum of squared valuations subject to utilitarian optimality, which can be solved e ciently in practice using standard solvers for convex programming. We will conclude with additional implications of this work, some work in progress, and directions for further research.
Other fairness criteria. e fairness concept we consider here is (approximate) envy-freeness. An obvious next step is to explore other criteria such as proportionality (each agent gets at least 1 /n of her valuation of the full collection of goods O), the maximin share guarantee or MMS (each agent gets at least as much value as she would realize if allowed to partition O completely among all agents knowing the she would receive her least favorite part), equitability (all agents have equal realized valuations), etc. (see, e.g. [Caragiannis et al., 2016 , Freeman et al., 2019 and references therein for further details) for (0, 1)-SUB valuations. We present our results from a preliminary exploration of these questions in Appendix B. It is worthwhile to summarize here one of these results that extends a recent paper by Freeman et al. [2019] . is paper shows that an allocation that is equitable up to one item or EQ1 (a relaxation of equitability in the same spirit as EF1) and PO may not exist even for binary additive valuations; however, for this valuation class, it can be veri ed in polynomial time whether an EQ1, EF1 and PO allocation exists and, whenever it does exist, it can also be computed in polynomial time (for the time complexity result, they show that such an allocation is MNW). We can generalize this result to (0, 1)-OXS valuations: we rst show that any EQ1 and PO allocation under the (0, 1)-SUB valuation class, if it exists, is leximin, then invoke Corollary 2.16 to conclude that it must be EF1, and nally eorem 3.1 to establish its polynomial-time complexity for the (0, 1)-OXS class.
More general valuation functions. Another imperative line of future work is investigating which of our ndings extend to more general submodular valuations (i.e. those with positive real marginal gains). An obvious generalization of the (0, 1)-SUB valuation function class is the class of submodular valuation functions with subjective binary marginal gains, i.e. ∆ i (S; o) ∈ {0, λ i } for some agentspeci c constant λ i > 0, for every i ∈ N . For this valuations class that we call (0, λ i )-SUB, we can show that any clean, MNW allocation is still EF1 (clean bundles being de ned the same way as for (0, 1)-SUB valuations) but the leximin and MNW allocations no longer coincide and leximin no longer implies EF1 (the details are in Appendix C).
For general assignment valuations (i.e. members have positive real weights for items), we have no theoretical guarantees yet. However, we ran experiments on a real-world dataset, comparing the performance of a heuristic extension of Algorithm 1 (Section 2.3) to real-valued individual-item utilities (weights) with Lipton et al. [2004] 's envy graph algorithm in terms of the number of items wasted (le unassigned or assigned to individuals with zero utility for it although another agent has positive utility for the item). ese experiments, described in detail in Appendix D, suggest that approximate envy-freeness can o en be achieved in practice simultaneously with good e ciency guarantees even for this larger valuation class.
It is important to note that the class of rank functions of a matroid (equivalently, (0, 1)-SUB functions) is a subclass of the gross substitutes (GS) valuations [Gul and Stacche i, 1999, Kelso and Crawford, 1982] . A promising research direction is to investigate PO+EF1 existence for GS valuations.
Implications for diversity. Finally, the analysis of submodular valuations ties in with existing works on diversity in various elds from biology to machine learning (see, e.g. Celis et al. [2016] , Jost [2006] ). A popular measurement for how diverse a solution is is to apply one of several concave functions called diversity indices to the proportions of the di erent entities/a ributes (with respect to which we wish to be diverse) in the solution, e.g. the Shannon entropy and the Gini-Simpson index: if we denote the maximum USW of one of the problem instances studied in this paper by U * and agent i's realized valuation in a utilitarian optimal allocation as u i , then the above two indices can be expressed as − i ∈N ( u i/U * ) ln( u i/U * ) and 1 − i ∈N ( u i/U * ) 2 respectively such that i ∈N u i = U * . us, eorem 2.14 also shows that, for (0, 1)-SUB valuations, the MNW or leximin principle maximizes among all utilitarian optimal allocations commonly used diversity indices applied to shares of the agents in the optimal USW. It will be interesting to explore potential connections of this concept to recent work on so diversity framed as convex function optimization [Ahmed et al., 2017] .
A APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS AND EXAMPLES
A.1 Example where no EF1 allocation is utilitarian optimal Example A.1. Consider an instance with three items and two agents Alice and Bob having additive valuations as described in Table 3 . e unique allocation maximizing USW is the one which 1 2 3
Alice: 1 /4 3 /8 3 /8 Bob: 0 1 /2 1 /2 Table 3 . An instance where no EF1 allocation is utilitarian optimal.
gives item 1 to Alice and items 2 and 3 to Bob for respective valuations 1 /4 and 1. However, even if either 2 or 3 were dropped from Bob's bundle, Alice would value it at 3 /8 > 1 /4; hence, the unique utilitarian optimal allocation is not EF1 and so no EF1 allocation can be utilitarian optimal.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
. is gives us the following telescoping series:
Since all marginal gains are binary, ∆ i (S ∪ S t −1 ; o t ) ≥ 0 for every t ∈ [r ], hence the above identity implies i (S) − i (T ) ≥ 0 for S ⊃ T , i.e. i is monotone.
Moreover, by se ing T = ∅ and noting that ∆ i (S ∪ S t −1 ; o t ) ≤ 1 for every t ∈ [r ], we get i (S) ≤ i (∅) + r = 0 + |S \ ∅| = |S |. 
A.4 Example of non-submodular valuations that violate the transferability property
Example A.2. Agent 1 wants to have a pair of matching shoes; her current allocated bundle is a single red shoe, whereas agent 2 has a matching pair of blue shoes. Agent 1 clearly envies agent 2, but cannot increase the value of her bundle by taking any one of agent 2's items. More formally, suppose N = [2] and O = {r L , b L , b R }; agent 1's valuation function is:
A.5 Proof of Corollary 2.8 P . Take an allocation A minimizes the sum of squares of the realized valuations among all utilitarian optimal allocations. en, there is a clean, utilitarian optimal allocation A that has the same sum of squares as A . We will show that A is EF1. Assume towards a contradiction that A is not EF1. en, there is a pair of agents i, j such that i envies j up to more than 1 item. By Lemma 2.5, there is an item o ∈ A j such that ∆ i (A i ; o) = 1. Let A * be the allocation achieved by transferring o from j to i, everything else remaining the same. By Lemma 2.6 and the fact that A j is clean, we have
proceeding exactly as in the proof of eorem 2.4another contradiction. Hence, A must be EF1.
A.6 Example of an EF1 and utilitarian optimal allocation violating EFX 0 Example A.3. ere are two groups and four items o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 4 . e rst group N 1 has two members a 1 , a 2 and the second group N 2 has three b 1 , b 2 , b 3 ; each individual has utility 1 for an item if and only if she is adjacent to it in the adjoining graph:
e (0, 1)-OXS valuation functions of groups N 1 and N 2 are denoted by 1 (·) and 2 (·) respectively. e allocation A where A 1 = {o 1 } and A 2 = {o 2 , o 3 , o 4 } is utilitarian optimal; it is also EF1 since 1 (A 1 ) = 1 = 1 (A 2 \ {o}) for o ∈ {o 2 , o 3 }, with ∆ 1 (A 2 \ {o 4 }; o 4 ) = 0, and 2 (A 2 ) = 3 > 0 = 2 (A 1 ). A could be the output of Algorithm 1 and is clean and complete. However, A is not EFX 0 since 1 (A 2 \ {o 4 }) = 2 > 1 = 1 (A 1 ).
B OTHER FAIRNESS CRITERIA UNDER (0, 1)-SUB VALUATIONS In the main paper, we have focused on Pareto optimal and EF1 allocations for the (0, 1)-SUB valuation class. However, many other concepts have been de ned and studied in the literature that formalize di erent intuitive ideas for what it means for an allocation of indivisible goods to be fair. In this section, we will investigate the implications of our results from the main paper for some alternative fairness notions.
An allocation A is said to be equitable or EQ if the realized valuations of all agents are equal under it, i.e. for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N , i (A i ) = j (A j ); an allocation A is equitable up to one item or EQ1 if, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that A j ∅, there exists some item o ∈ A j such that i (A i ) ≥ j (A j \ {o}) [Freeman et al., 2019] . 7 We can further relax the equitability criterion up to an arbitrary number of items: an allocation A is said to be equitable up to c items or EQc if, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that |A j | > c, there exists some subset S ∈ A j of size |S | = c such that i (A i ) ≥ j (A j \ S). 8 7 Note that if A j = ∅ for some j, i (A i ) ≥ j (A j ) trivially. Hence the ordered pair (i, j) for any i ∈ N \ {j } could never prevent the allocation from being EQ1. 8 Again, if |A j | ≤ c for some j, no ordered pair (i, j) for any i ∈ N \ {j } could get in the way of the allocation being EQc. Freeman et al. [2019] show 9 that, even for binary additive valuations (which is a subclass of the (0, 1)-OXS valuation class), an allocation that is both EQ1 and PO may not exist; however, in eorem 4, they establish that it can be veri ed in polynomial time whether an EQ1, EF1 and PO allocation exists and, whenever it does exist, it can also be computed in polynomial timeunder binary additive valuations. We will show that the above positive result about computational tractability extends to the (0, 1)-OXS valuation class. We will begin by proving that under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, an EQ1 and PO allocation, if it exists, is also EF1 -we achieve this by combining eorem B.1 below with Corollary 2.8. is simpli es the problem of nding an EQ1, EF1 and PO allocation to that of nding an EQ1 and PO allocation. Hence, from eorem 2.14, we further obtain that if an EQ1 and PO allocation exists under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, it is also MNW and a minimizer of any symmetric strictly convex function of agents' realized valuations among all utilitarian optimal allocations. Moreover, eorem B.1, together with Corollary 2.16, implies that if an EQ1 and PO allocation exists under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, it must be EF1.
P
. Let the optimal USW for a problem instance under this valuation class be U * ; also, suppose this instance admits an EQ1 and PO allocation A. e EQ1 property implies that for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that A j ∅,
is inequality holds trivially and strictly if A j = ∅. us, max i ∈N i (A i ) ≤ min i ∈N i (A i ) + 1. In other words, there exist a non-negative integer α ≤ U * and a positive integer n 0 ∈ [n] such that n 0 agents have valuations α each and the remaining agents, if any, have valuations α + 1 each under allocation A, with U * = n 0 α + (n − n 0 )(α + 1) = nα + n − n 0 . We can write the agents' realized valuations under A (with arbitrary tie-breaking) as the n-dimensional vector θ (A) = α, α, . . . , α n 0 entries , α + 1, α + 1, . . . , α + 1 n − n 0 entries . If A were not leximin, there would be another allocation A for which the corresponding valuation vector θ (A ) would have an entry strictly higher than that of A at the same position, say n ∈ [n]. If n ≤ n 0 , then every entry of θ (A ) from position n is at least α + 1, so the USW under A is U ≥ (n − 1)α + (n − n + 1)(α + 1) = nα + n − n + 1 ≥ nα + n − n 0 + 1 = U * + 1. 9 Freeman et al. [2019] use an example with 3 agents having binary additive valuations (Example 1). But it is easy to construct a fair allocation instance with only two agents having binary additive valuations that does not admit an EQ1 Obviously, any PO allocation must give {o 2 , o 3 , o 4 } to agent 1 so that this agent's realized valuation is at least 2 even a er dropping one of its items; even if agent 2 receives o 1 , her realized valuation of 1 will always be less than the above. If n 0 < n ≤ n, then similarly, U ≥ n 0 α + (n − n 0 − 1)(α + 1) + (n − n + 1)(α + 2)
In either case, we have a contradiction since U * is the optimal utilitarian social welfare for this instance. Hence, A must be leximin.
We conjecture that a stronger result holds: under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, the leximin allocation is optimally EQc for c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m} among all PO allocations. A proof or a counterexample remains elusive. We present this more formally as follows:
For a problem instance where all agents have submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any EQ1 and PO allocation, if it exists, if c * is the smallest c ∈ [m] for which a leximin allocation is EQc, then the instance admits no PO allocation that is EQc for any c < c * .
C SUBMODULARITY WITH SUBJECTIVE BINARY GAINS
An obvious generalization of the (0, 1)-SUB valuation function class is the class of submodular valuation functions with subjective binary marginal gains: agent i's bundle-valuation function i (·) is said to have subjective binary marginal gains if ∆ i (S; o) ∈ {0, λ i } for some agent-speci c constant λ i > 0, for every i ∈ N . We de ne clean bundles and clean allocations for this function class exactly as we did for (0, 1)-SUB valuations in Section 2.
Understandably, most of the properties of allocations under (0, 1)-SUB valuations do not extend to this more general se ing. It is obvious that Pareto optimality does not imply utilitarian optimality (e.g. consider an instance with two agents and one item which the agents value at 1 and 2 respectively: assigning the item to agent 1 is PO but not utilitarian optimal). Moreover, the leximin allocation may not be EF1, as shown by the following example where both agents have additive valuations. It is straightforward to check that the unique leximin allocation is A 1 = {o 1 , o 2 , o 3 }, A 2 = {o 4 }. Under this allocation, 1 (A 2 ) = 0 < 3 = 1 (A 1 ), but 2 (A 1 \ {o}) = 6 > 3 = 2 (A 2 ) for every o ∈ A 1 -in fact, at least two (any two) items must be removed from A 1 for agent 2 to stop envying agent 1.
Note another di erence of this valuation class from (0, 1)-SUB that is also evidenced by Example C.1: the leximin and MNW allocations may not coincide. In this example, any allocation A that gives two of the items {o 2 , o 3 , o 4 } to agent 1 and the rest to agent 2 is MNW, with 1 (A 1 ) = 2 and 2 (A 2 ) = 6, so that NW(A) = 12; such an allocation is also EF1 (in fact, envy-free) since 1 (A 2 ) = 1 < 2 = 1 (A 1 ) and 2 (A 1 ) = 6 = 2 (A 2 ). is is not an accident, as the following theorem shows. 
Now, if agent i's allocated bundle under an allocation A has a valuation i (A i ) = λ i |A i |, then her marginal gain for any item in o ∈ A i is given by
where the rst inequality follows from Inequality (C.1) and the fact that |A i \ {o}| = |A i | − 1. is means that the bundle A i is clean and, since this holds for every i, the allocation is clean. is completes the proof of the "if" part. If allocation A is clean, then we must have ∆ i (A i \ {o}; o) > 0 for every o ∈ A i for every i ∈ N . Let us de ne an arbitrary agent i's bundle A i as S above, so that
is completes the proof of the "only if" part. L C.4. For submodular functions with subjective binary marginal gains, if agent i envies agent j up to more than 1 item under clean allocation A, then |A j | ≥ |A i | + 2.
P
. Since i envies j under A up to more than 1 item, we must have A j ∅ and i (A i ) < i (A j \ {o}) for every o ∈ A j . Consider one such o. From Inequality (C.1) in the proof of Proposition C.3,
We are now ready to prove eorem C.2. P T C.2. Our proof non-trivially extends that of eorem 3.2 of Caragiannis et al. [2016] . We will rst address the case when it is possible to allocate items in such a way that each agent has a positive realized valuation for its bundle, i.e. N max = N in the de nition of an MNW allocation, and then tackle the scenario N max N .
Consider a pair of agents 1, 2 ∈ N w.l.o.g. such that 1 envies 2 up to two or more items, if possible, under an MNW allocation A. Since every agent has a positive realized valuation under A, we have i (A i ) = λ i |A i | > 0, i.e. |A i | > 0 for each i ∈ {1, 2}. From Lemma 2.5, we know that there is an item in A 2 for which agent 1 has positive marginal utility -consider any one such item o ∈ A 2 . us, ∆ 1 (A 1 ; o) > 0, i.e. ∆ 1 (A 1 ; o) = λ 1 ; also, since A 2 is a clean bundle, ∆ 2 (A 2 \ {o}; o) > 0, i.e. ∆ 2 (A 2 \ {o}; o) = λ 2 .
Let us convert A to a new allocation A by only transferring this item o from agent 2 to agent 1. Hence, 1 (A 1 ) = 1 (A 1 ) + ∆ 1 (A 1 ; o) = 1 (A 1 ) + λ 1 , 2 (A 2 ) = 2 (A 2 ) − ∆ 2 (A 2 \ {o}; o) = 2 (A 2 ) − λ 2 , i (A i ) = i (A i ) for each i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. NW(A) is positive since A is MNW and N max = N . Hence,
Here, the third equality comes from Proposition C.3 since A is clean, and the rst inequality from Lemma C.4 due to our assumption. But NW(A ) > NW(A) contradicts the optimality of A, implying that any agent can envy another up to at most 1 item under A. is completes the proof for the N max = N case. e rest of the proof mirrors the corresponding part of the proof of Caragiannis et al. [2016] 's eorem 3.2. If N max N , it is easy to see that there can be no envy towards any i N max : this is because we must have i (A i ) = 0 for any such i from the de nition of N max , which in turn implies that A i = ∅ since A is clean; hence, j (A i ) = 0 for every j ∈ N . Also, for any i, j ∈ N max , we can show exactly as in the proof for the N max = N case above that there cannot be envy up to more than one item between them, since A maximizes the Nash welfare over this subset of agents N max . Suppose for contradiction that an agent i ∈ N \N max envies some j ∈ N max up to more than one item under A. en, from Lemma 2.5, there is one item o 1 ∈ A j w.l.o.g. such that i ({o 1 }) = ∆ i (∅; o 1 ) = ∆ i (A i ; o 1 ) > 0. Moreover, since A is clean,
where the rst inequality comes from Lemma C.4. us, if we transfer o 1 from j to i and leave all other bundles unchanged, then every agent in N max ∪ {i} will have a positive valuation under the new allocation. is contradicts the maximality of N max . Hence, any i ∈ N \N max must be envy-free up to one item towards any j ∈ N max .
D GENERAL ASSIGNMENT VALUATIONS
In this section, we introduce an extension of the envy-induced transfers (Algorithm 1) to general valuations, as described in Algorithm 2. Recall that the general principle is to iteratively eliminate envy by transfering an item from the envied bundle to the envied bundle until no agent is envied up to more than one item. Here at each iteration step, we transfer the item that induces the maximal increase in overall utility (see lines 3-6). Note that, since agent j loses one of her items, she may develop a positive marginal utility for a currently withheld item; in that case, the item in A 0 for which she has maximal marginal utility is given to her (see lines 6-8). Note also that, for arbitrary utilities, if an agent i acquires a new item o due to an envy-induced transfer, at most one of her previous items, say o * , may become unused, e.g. if i's positive marginal utility for o with her previous bundle A i was due to the fact that the individual who was assigned item o * has a higher utility for o than o * and no other indivual prefers o * to its assigned item. In that case, item o * is revoked from agent i and allocated to the agent with maximal and strictly positive marginal utility for it (see lines 10-13). If this creates another unused item, we repeat the process until there are no unused items or the unused item has zero marginal utility for all agents -in the la er case, the unused item is added to the withheld set (see lines 14-18). We now provide numerical results to compare the loss incurred by Algorithm 2 and that of P L the extension of [Lipton et al., 2004] algorithm to groups of agents, as presented in [Benabbou et al., 2019] . e performances of these procedure are estimated both in terms of percentage of items wasted (Waste) and price of fairness (PoF) which is formally de ned as follows:
where A(P) is the allocation returned by a given procedure P. In our experiments, we use the dataset called "MovieLens-ml-1m" which contains approximately 1,000,000 ratings (from 0 to 5) of 4,000 movies made by 6,000 users [Harper and Konstan., 2015] . To generate an instance of our allocation problem, we select 200 movies at random (|O | = 200) and then we only consider the users that rated at least one of these movies. We use the user ratings as individual utilities. We consider the following user partitions:
• Gender: 2 agents (male or female),
• Age: 7 agents representing the 7 age-groups, and the following agents' valuations:
• Ratings:
where r uo is the rating of movie o made by user u, • Norm: i (S) = i (S)/ i (O), for all agents i ∈ N representing a group of users and for all bundles of movies S ⊆ O. e results given in Table 4 are averaged over 50 runs.
In Table 4 , we observe that P L the extension of [Lipton et al., 2004] algorithm to groups may be wasteful but in practice it has almost zero-waste and also good PoF (the lower the be er). In comparison, Algorithm 2 the extension of the envy-induced transfers to general valuations is guaranteed to be non-wasteful but in practice it has larger PoF than P L .
Algorithm 2: Envy-Induced Transfers for general valuations 1 Compute a clean, socially optimal allocation. 2 /**Envy-Induced Transfers and Reallocations**/ 3 while ∃i, j ∈ N such that i envies j up to more than 1 item do 4 Pick i, j, o maximizing ∆ i (A i ; o) + ∆(A j ; o) over all i, j ∈ N and all o ∈ O such that i envies j more than 1 item and ∆ i (A i ; o) > 0. 
